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Constitutional Law. Pellegrino v. Rhode Island Ethics Com-
mission, 788 A.2d 119 (R.I. 2002). The state impliedly waived sov-
ereign immunity by enacting a statute that provided for specific
compensation to be paid to commission members. Plaintiffs have a
vested property right in the compensation that was provided by
statute; therefore, the taking of that compensation for the public's
use without compensation violated the Rhode Island Constitution.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiffs, former members of the Rhode Island Ethics
Commission, brought suit against the Commission (defendant) to
recover unpaid compensation that they were entitled to by stat-
ute.1 A state statute provided for certain public officials to receive
compensation for attending several commission meetings between
1991 and 1992.2 On January 1, 1991, the governor issued an exec-
utive order suspending the pay of certain public employees, includ-
ing the commission.3 Thereafter, the order was ratified by the
general assembly.4 On June 7, 1991, the general assembly enacted
a law,5 which allowed those members of the commission who per-
formed adjudicatory functions, including plaintiffs, to receive ret-
roactive compensation to February 15, 1991.6 On July 14, 1992,
the general assembly enacted another law,7 which suspended the
pay of members of commissions and boards.5 It did not contain an
exception for those members who performed adjudicatory
functions.9
Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to compensation for the
meetings they attended between February 15, 1991, and July 14,
1992.10 These were the dates between when the general assembly
enacted the law providing an exception for the commission mem-
bers who performed adjudicatory functions and when the general
assembly enacted the law that suspended the commission mem-
1. Pellegrino v. R.I. Ethics Comm'n, 788 A.2d 1119, 1121 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 1991 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 44.
6. Pellegrino, 788 A.2d at 1121.
7. 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 133.
8. Pellegrino, 788 A.2d at 1121.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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bers' pay without providing an exception for those members who
performed adjudicatory functions."' Plaintiffs based their claim on
the just-compensation clause of the state and federal
constitutions. 12
The motion justice dismissed the claim for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, concluding that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity barred the lawsuit. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first considered whether the
doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs' claim.' 4 It
answered in the negative. 15 The court held that by voluntarily en-
acting a statute providing specific compensation for the commis-
sion members, the state impliedly waived the doctrine of sovereign
immunity when responding to the commission members' attempts
to collect the compensation provided.16 If the state were allowed to
invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the principle of the leg-
islation would be flouted and the provisions would be nugatory.' 7
In addition, by enacting a statute providing compensation to be
paid to government officials in exchange for services rendered to
the state, the state was acting as a private employer rather than a
sovereign; therefore, the state could not invoke sovereign immu-
nity in this respect.' 8 Due to the aforementioned reasons, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs' claim
was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 19
The court then considered whether the plaintiffs' claim was
supported by the just-compensation guarantees in the state and
federal constitutions.20 It answered in the affirmative. 21 The stat-
ute providing compensation for the commission members for at-
tendance at meetings in 1991 and 1992, along with the commission
11. Id. at 1122.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1123.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1124.
17. Id. at 1125.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1123.
20. Id. at 1126 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972)).
21. Id.
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members' attendance at those meetings, gave the members a
vested property interest in the compensation under the Rhode Is-
land Constitution.22 Since plaintiffs had a vested property interest
in the compensation, the state violated the constitution by taking
that compensation for the public's use without due process of law
and just compensation. 23
CONCLUSION
The state can impliedly waive the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity. In the instant case, the court held that the state could not
invoke sovereign immunity to defend against an action seeking
compensation under a statute that was voluntarily enacted by the
state. The statute would be rendered meaningless if the state was
allowed to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The court also held that the taking of compensation for the
public's use without just compensation is a violation of the Rhode
Island Constitution. The commission members had a vested prop-
erty right in the compensation; therefore, taking the compensation
violated the just-compensation guarantees in the state
constitution.
Amy Hughes
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Constitutional Law. State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016 (R.I.
2002). An indigent defendant in a criminal case is entitled to
court-appointed counsel, but unwarranted rejection of qualified at-
torneys can serve as a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. A
knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel does not require any
special dialogue between the trial judge and defendant, but is
based on the totality of the circumstances. Restriction on move-
ment of a pro se defendant is not a violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment right of self-representation.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant, Christopher S. Thornton (Thornton), had been
involved with Debra Means (Debra) for six years; they had a
daughter, Amy.' Thornton had physically abused Debra until she
ended the relationship in Spring 1996.2 In fear of further harm,
Debra obtained a no-contact order against Thornton, but the order
still allowed Thornton to visit his daughter.3
On June 18, 1996, as Debra was preparing to take Amy to her
babysitter before going to work, Thornton unexpectedly arrived at
her home. 4 He immediately threatened her with a knife and forced
her to call her place of employment to explain she would be absent
from work because of car trouble.5 Shortly thereafter, the babysit-
ter (Diane) called Debra a number of times, wanting to know when
Debra would be bringing Amy over.6 Sensing Debra was in dan-
ger, Diane asked Debra if Thornton was there.7 When Debra re-
plied "yes," Diane, knowing of the no-contact order, called the
Narragansett police.8
Thornton kept Debra captive in the house during a fourteen-
hour standoff with the police. 9 During this time, Thornton repeat-
1. State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1020 (R.L 2002). Amy is not the child's
real name. Id. at 1020 n.1.
2. Id. at 1020.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. During a later call to Debra, Diane talked to Thornton who threatened
her if she were to testify against him on a different charge. Id. at 1020 n.3.
9. Id. at 1021. The police were able to persuade Thornton to release Amy
shortly after the standoff began. Id.
20031
480 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:421
edly threatened and assaulted Debra.10 After deciding further ne-
gotiations would be unsuccessful, the Narragansett police
requested assistance from the South Kingstown Emergency Ser-
vices Unit. 1 That unit forcibly entered the house, rescued Debra,
and captured Thornton. 12
Thornton was indicted and charged with ten offenses.13 After
a trial, a jury convicted him of five: (1) felony assault with a dan-
gerous weapon, (2) felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury,
(3) violation of a no-contact order, (4) kidnapping Debra, and (5)
intimidating a witness, Diane. 14 The court dismissed one charge
on a defense motion after the state finished presenting its case. 15
The jury found Thornton not guilty on the remaining four
charges. 16
The primary point of contention throughout this case was
Thornton's choice to represent himself pro se after rejection of his
court-appointed attorneys. 17 After less than one month of repre-
sentation, Thornton moved to dismiss his first court-appointed
counsel, citing a lack of comfort with the attorney.' 8 After the
court deferred proceedings with instructions for Thornton and his
counsel to work together to resolve their problems; Thornton,
thereafter, renewed his request that a new public defender be ap-
pointed based on differences of opinion that were affecting the at-
torney-client relationship.19  The hearing justice allowed
appointment of new counsel, while warning that any future re-
moval would require more justification. 20
Three weeks prior to the scheduled trial, Thornton filed a dis-
ciplinary complaint against his second lawyer.21 The motion jus-
10. Id.
11. Id. The negotiations continued for twelve hours prior to this decision. Id.
12. Id. Debra was immediately hospitalized because of her injuries. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1021-22.
15. Id. at 1021 n.8. The charge dismissed was breaking and entering a dwell-
ing. Id.
16. Id. at 1022. The four charges included: (1) first-degree sexual assault, (2)
assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling, (3) assault with intent to commit
murder, and (4) kidnapping Amy. Id.
17. Id. at 1022-31.
18. Id. at 1022.
19. Id. Five weeks passed between the initial request and the renewed re-
quest. Id.
20. Id. at 1022-23.
21. Id. at 1023.
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tice allowed withdrawal of the second attorney because of a
perceived conflict of interest, despite noting that Thornton was try-
ing to delay the start of the trial.22
A few weeks later, Thornton appeared before the trial judge to
determine whether he would proceed pro se, with his second attor-
ney, or with private counsel. 23 Thornton complained that he was
being forced to represent himself, but agreed to appointment of an
experienced criminal defense attorney as standby counsel.24 When
the trial court proposed that standby counsel become the attorney
of record; Thornton rejected the idea.25 The trial court then ruled
his doing so constituted a third rejection of counsel.26
During the trial, the judge placed limitations on the defen-
dant's movements by: requiring defendant to be in handcuffs if he
attended side-bar conferences, requiring standby counsel to par-
ticipate in chamber conferences in lieu of the defendant, and
prohibiting the defendant from approaching witnesses.2 7 These re-
strictions were to apply during voir dire, as well as during the
trial. 28 Thornton refused to participate in the side-bar conferences
because he felt that the jury would be prejudiced by his appearance
in handcuffs.29 The trial judge noted that defendant's rights were
protected by the participation of standby counsel in each of these
conferences. 30 In addition, Thornton requested standby counsel
file certain motions, make certain legal arguments, and question
particular witnesses on his behalf.3l
After conviction, the defendant appealed, citing multiple
grounds, two of which were waiver of counsel and undue impair-
ment of his right to self-representation. 32
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1024.
25. Id.
26. Id. Thornton later moved to dismiss his standby counsel on the grounds
he was incompetent in the area of diminished capacity, an anticipated defense. Id.
27. Id. at 1031-39.
28. Id. at 1032.
29. Id. at 1034.
30. Id. at 1055 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1024-25.
32. Id. at 1022. Other grounds for appeal included: exclusion of evidence re-
lated to diminished capacity defense, introduction of past incidents of misconduct
during cross examination of a witness, and denial of a motion to reduce sentence.
Id.
2003]
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Thornton first asserted that his waiver of right to counsel was
constitutionally invalid.33 A constitutional waiver must be volun-
tary, knowing and intelligent.3 4 Thornton conceded the waiver
was voluntary.3 5 However, he contended his waiver was not know-
ing and intelligent because the trial judge did not engage him in a
detailed colloquy.36 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
this detailed colloquy, though preferred was not constitutionally
mandated.37 Instead, the trial judge could take a totality of the
circumstances 38 approach analyzing the following six factors:
(1) the background, the experience, and the conduct of the de-
fendant including his age, his education, and his physical and
mental health; (2) the extent to which the defendant has had
contact with lawyers before the hearing; (3) the defendant's
knowledge of the nature of the proceeding and the sentence
that may potentially be [I imposed; (4) the question of
whether standby counsel has been appointed and the extent
to which he or she has aided the defendant before or at the
hearing; (5) the question of whether waiver of counsel was the
result of mistreatment or coercion; and (6) the question of
whether the defendant is trying to manipulate the events of
the hearing.39
Reviewing those factors, the supreme court found that Thorn-
ton had extensive experience in the criminal justice system, had
ample opportunity to discuss strategy with his three attorneys,
clearly understood the charges against him, and utilized his ap-
pointed standby counsel. 40 The court, therefore, held that the
waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.41
Thornton next asserted the trial court judge violated his con-
stitutional right to self-representation. 42 In conducting an analy-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1025 (citing State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 486 (R.I. 2001) (citing
State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1380 (R.I. 1996) (per curiam))).
35. Id. at 1025-26.
36. Id. at 1026.
37. Id. at 1026-27 (quoting State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 416-17 (R.I. 2001))
38. Id. at 1027 (quoting Spencer, 783 A.2d at 416-17).
39. Id. at 1027 (quoting Briggs, 787 A.2d at 486 (quoting Chabot, 682 A.2d at
1380)).
40. Id. at 1028-30.
41. Id. at 1031.
42. Id.
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sis of the trial judge's restrictions on the defendant, the supreme
court looked at "whether the defendant had a fair chance to pre-
sent his case in his own way."43 Previous cases have held that the
claim that standby counsel interfered with the defendant's right to
represent himself will be eroded if the defendant requests standby
counsel to participate in the proceedings. 44 The Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution imposes two limitations on
standby counsel participation: (1) the defendant must be able to
preserve actual control and (2) standby counsel participation does
not destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is acting pro
se.
45
In analyzing the defendant's control over his case, the su-
preme court noted that Thornton was able to present any part of
his case that he chose to present to the jury.46 The only limitation
was a handcuff requirement for the side-bar conferences. 47 Thorn-
ton argued his appearance in handcuffs would prejudice the jury,
therefore he had no meaningful choice regarding side-bar confer-
ences.48 The court disagreed, stating that a simple jury instruction
would have alleviated this concern. 49 Continuing its analysis the
court stated that the trial judge's main concern had to be the safety
of all parties involved, as such he was given full discretion over the
manner in which the trial proceeded.50 The trial judge's restric-
tions on the defendant were reasonable in light of the violent na-
ture of the offenses involved. 51 Therefore, the supreme court held
that Thornton did not prove lack of control over his defense, when
standby counsel represented him at side-bar and chambers
conferences. 52
43. Id. (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984)).
44. Id. (citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182-83).
45. Id. (citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178-79)
46. Id. at 1033.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1034. The dissent had a different view of the voir dire side-bars.
Justice Flanders argued Thornton was prohibited from attending any side-bars
during voir dire, but allowed to attend those during the trial if he wore handcuffs.
Id. at 1054. (Flanders, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1034-35.
50. Id. at 1032.
51. Id. at 1033.
52. Id. at 1036, 1039. Thornton argued he was prohibited from approaching
witnesses. Id. at 1039. The majority stated that the record did not contain any
information to support this claim. Id.
20031
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In analyzing the jury's perception of self-representation, the
court found that three facts would mandate the jury conclude
Thornton had represented himself.53 These were: the trial judge
issued an instruction to the jury about the pro se representation,
Thornton continually stated that he was representing himself, and
the nature of Thornton's participation in the case.54 The court con-
cluded the jury would interpret the standby counsel's participation
in these matters to be at Thornton's request, as Thornton had re-
quested such participation in other areas. 55
The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion in this case limited his focus to the
court's holding on waiver of counsel and impairment of Thornton's
right to self-representation. 56 In regards to the waiver, the dissent
argued the failure to have a colloquy about the dangers of self-rep-
resentation was a violation of Thornton's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.57 Therefore, the dissent argued the error occurred
when the motion justice ordered defendant to accept his second
counsel or represent himself without a discussion on the dangers of
self-representation. 58 It was necessary, in the dissent's view, to es-
tablish on the record the knowledge of the defendant before the
waiver.59
In addressing the impairment to the defendant's right to self-
representation, the dissent dissected the issue into two sub-issues:
voir dire and substantive conferences. 60 The dissent argued that
non-participation in voir dire was a direct violation of the right to
self-representation. 61 Arguing that it was the right to be heard,
and not the substance of the conferences that was protected, the
dissent regarded almost all restrictions of movement as violative of
53. Id. at 1035.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1045 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1046-48.
58. Id. at 1048-50. The dissent details that the Spencer court, relied on by the
majority as not requiring a colloquy, did at least engage in a "pragmatic inquiry"
into the defendant's knowledge of the dangers. Id. (citing State v. Spencer, 783
A.2d 413, 418 (R.I. 2001)).
59. Id. at 1050.
60. Id. at 1053-62.
61. Id. at 1059 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984)).
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the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.62 The dissent
further stated that Sixth Amendment right to counsel violations
cannot be subject to harmless-error analysis.63 The dissent went
on to argue that the choice of handcuffs or non-participation is not
appropriate because other possible measures existed to ensure the
safety of the court.64
In regards to the substantive conferences outside the jury's
presence, the only limitation imposed by precedent was the defen-
dant must retain actual control. 65 The dissent stated a court vio-
lates this limitation when the defendant is not allowed to
participate openly in conferences, but is informed after the confer-
ence of the decisions that the court made.66 Therefore, even
though the substance of the conferences generally favored Thorn-
ton, the dissent argued Thornton's exclusion from them to be er-
ror.6 7 The dissent would have vacated the superior court decision
and remanded for a new trial.68
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an indigent crimi-
nal defendant waived his right to court-appointed counsel through
unwarranted rejection of qualified attorneys. The court recom-
mended, but did not require, a special dialogue between the trial
judge and defendant to find a knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel. The judge was given broad discretion when he placed re-
strictions on movement of a pro se defendant for the purposes of
safety of all participants in the trial. Therefore, such restrictions
were not violations of the right to self-representation clause in the
Sixth Amendment.
Larry D. White
Kyle Zambarano
62. Id. at 1056-57 (citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 179).
63. Id. at 1057.
64. Id. at 1059.
65. Id. at 1061.
66. Id. at 1061-62 (citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 179).
67. Id. at 1061.
68. Id. at 1063.
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